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COMMENTS ON REICH v. PURCELL

David P. Currie*
Not many years ago it would have been exciting news that the
Supreme Court of California had rejected traditional learning and
resolved a wrongful death choice-of-law problem by analyzing
state interests. Today it would be surprising if that court treated
such a case in any other way. It is true that some states have
squarely repudiated the new learning.' But interest analysis has
been explicitly employed by the highest courts of New Hampshire,
New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, as well as by
some of the federal courts,' and this list is not meant to be exhaustive. Therefore even the news that another state had for the first
time employed the interest analysis would be little more earthshaking than word that still another state had adopted a long-arm
statute; and California had long since joined the parade in the
early and important case of Bernkrant v. Fowler.'
But the decision in Reich v. Purcell does afford an opportunity
for invidious comparisons between the choice-of-law records of two
of our most influential courts, the highest courts of California and
of New York. The New York Court of Appeals, in its familiar decision in Auten v. Auten,4 was among the very first to break cleanly
with Mr. Beale's fetters by announcing that it would consider not
one, but all contacts, and its Babcock v. Jackson5 was a pioneer of
interest analysis. Yet since Auten the New York court has hopped
frenetically from theory to theory like an overheated jumping bean:
from high-handed manipulation of the traditional procedure and
public policy doctrines6 to a robotish totting up of contacts without
* A.B., University of Chicago, 1957; LL.B., Harvard Law School, 1960. Associate Professor of Law, University of Chicago.
1 See, e.g., Landers v. Landers, 153 Conn. 303, 216 A.2d 183 (1966); Friday v.
Smoot, 211 A.2d 594 (Del. 1965); White v. King, 244 Md. 3.48, 223 A.2d 763 (1966).
2 See, e.g., Williams v. Rawlings Truck Line, 357 F.2d 581 (D.C. Cir. 1965);
Johnson v. Johnson, 107 N.H. 30, 216 A.2d 781 (1966); Babcock v. Jackson, 12
N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963); Lilienthal v. Kaufman, 239
Ore. 1, 395 P.2d 543 (1964); Griffith v. United Air Lines, 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796
(1964); Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 133 N.W.2d 408 (1965).
3 55 Cal. 2d 588, 360 P.2d 906, 12 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1961).
4 308 N.Y. .155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954).
5 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
6 Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133
(1961). The procedural basis of Kilberg was repudiated in Davenport v. Webb, 11
N.Y.2d 392, 183 N.E.2d 902, 230 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1962). For the court's less-thanconsistent use of public policy compare Kilberg with Intercontinental Hotels Corp. v.
Golden, 15 N.Y.2d 9, 203 N.E.2d 210, 254 N.Y.S.2d 527 (1964) and Rosenstiel v.
Rosenstiel, 16 N.Y.2d 64, 209 N.E.2d 709, 262 N.Y.S.2d 86 (1965). In neither of the
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regard for policy; 7 from an old-fashioned choice between equally
plausible characterizations' and a situs rule tempered slightly by
party autonomy9 to the use of interest analysis to reach contradictory results in two practically identical cases. 10 Two of the most
recent opinions blazenly combine the oil with the water. Otlarsh v.

Aetna Insurance Company" applied a Puerto Rican direct-action
statute because Puerto Rico had an interest in its application and

was the jurisdiction with the most significant relationship, adding
that the statute was neither procedural nor contrary to New York
policy; lames v. Powell' 2 held unambiguously that whether a transfer of Puerto Rican land by a New York citizen defrauded the
holder of a New York judgment was to be determined by the law
of the situs but that New York had the "strongest interest" in de-

ciding whether or not to award punitive damages.
Revolutions cannot always be completed overnight, especially
when judges are asked to make them; also, it is only fair to point
out that this bizarre accretion of decisions represents the handiwork of several judges with divergent views and was accompanied
by a number of dissents. But the New York court's inability to keep
its collective mind made up greatly increases the burden on lawyers
who must argue all variants of both traditional and modern analyses
in every case, and creates a strong incentive for appealing as many
cases as possible to the state's high court. In addition, if there is any
force left in the notion that choice-of-law doctrines ought to facililast two cases did the court consider whether on a contacts or interest analysis New
York law should be applied.
7 Haag v. Barnes, 9 N.Y.2d 554, 175 N.E.2d 441, 216 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1961). Contrast
Downs v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 14 N.Y.2d 266, 200 N.E.2d 204, 251 N.Y.S.2d
19 (1964) (alternative holding), in which the court held New York law applicable
by loosely discussing contacts and policies and by noting that any interest of
Massachusetts had been acquired after the events in suit. Both cases concerned
support for New York women (query, in Haag) and their children.
8 In re Utassi, 15 N.Y.2d 436, 209 N.E.2d 65, 261 N.Y.S.2d 4 (1965).
9 Wyatt v. Fulrath, 16 N.Y.2d 169, 211 N.E.2d 637, 264 N.Y.S.2d 233 (1965).
In James V. Powell, 19 N.Y.2d 249, 225 N.E.2d 741, 279 N.Y.S.2d 10 (1967), the
situs rule Was unmitigated. Cf. In re Bauer, 14 N.Y.2d 272, 200 N.E.2d 207, 251
N.Y.S.2d 23 (1964), invalidating an Englishwoman's testamentary exercise in England
of a power of appointment in a trust she had set up while living in New York
becduse "the law to be applied here is the law of New York which was the donor's
domicile and where there was executed the trust agreement containing the power of
appointment .... " Id. at 277, 200 N.E.2d at 209, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 25.
10 Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965);
Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963). See
Macey v. Rozbicki, 18 N.Y.2d 289, 221 N.E.2d 380, 274 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1966) ("reconciling" the two by counting contacts divorced from policy); Long v. Pan American
World Airways, 16 N.Y.2d 337, 213 N.E.2d 796, 266 N.Y.S.2d 513 (1965) (applying
th. Babcock analysis in a wrongful death case).
11 15 N.Y.2d 111, 204 N.E.2d 622, 256 N.Y.S.2d 577 (i965).
12 19 N.Y.2d 249, 225 N.E.2d 741, 279 N.Y.S.2d 10 (1967).
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tate the planning of conduct by enabling people to predict the legal
consequences of their contemplated acts, New York's zigzag course
leaves something to be desired in that respect as well. It may be
hoped that the matter will be set to rest by Judge Keating's excel3 applying
lent opinion in Matter of Crichton,"
the interest analysis
to hold that Louisiana personalty owned by a New York decedent
was not subject to a community property interest in his New York
wife. But then some of us had similar hopes at the time of Babcock
v. Jackson.
Quite another story is California's. It was to be expected that
the crude opinion in Grant v. McAuliffe, 4 which resorted in part to
the unacceptable statement that whether a personal injury action
survives the tortfeasor's death was a "procedural" matter, would
evoke pained responses from the critics.' 5 Nor was there anything
new in the method; courts unwilling to live with the senseless results dictated by Beale's analysis had been exploiting the looseness
of his basic system or deliberately misapplying it for years. 16 But
of course the result reached in Grant was right, for an Arizona law
whose purpose, if any, was the protection of Arizona estates was
simply not applicable to a dead Californian. 1 7 And by the time of
Bernkrant v. Fowler"5 the California court had developed the vocabulary to explain, as courts ought to do if there is any sense in
their writing opinions, the relevant considerations: The applicability of California law to a case containing foreign facts was to be
determined by construing the law in light of its purpose. Since the
13 20 N.Y.2d 124, 228 N.E.2d 799, 281 N.Y.S.2d 811 (1967).

Especially encour-

aging is the court's statement, in footnote 8, that "[clontacts obtain significance
only to the extent that they relate to the policies and purposes sought to be vindicated by the conflicting laws." Id. at 135, 288 N.E.2d at 806, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 820.
Acceptance of this principle, also strongly suggested by Babcock, would equate the
interest and contacts analyses. It is perhaps too bad that the parties in Crichton
conceded the applicability of Louisiana law to realty located there, since the same
policy considerations seem to govern its disposition in this case. See generally Hancock,
Full Faith and Credit to Foreign Laws and Judgments in Real Property Litigation,
18 STAN. L. REv. 1299 (1966). But the treatment of the situs problem in James v.
Powell, 19 N.Y.2d 249, 225 N.E.2d 741, 279 N.Y.S.2d 10 (1967), does not give much
cause for optimism on this issue.
14 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953).
15 See, e.g., Sumner, Choice of Law Governing Survival of Actions, 9 HAST. L.J.

128 (1958).
16 See, e.g., Duckwall v. Lease, 106 Ind. App. 664, 20 N.E.2d 204 (1939); Mertz
v. Mertz, 271 N.Y. 466, 3 N.E.2d 597 (1936). See Professor Leflar's marvelous series
of Arkansas cases, e.g., Western Union Tel. Co. v. Chilton, 100 Ark. 296, 140 S.W. 26
(1911); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Griffin, 92 Ark. 219, 122 S.W. 489 (1909), in which
the court alternately characterized the question of damages for failure to deliver a
telegram as contract or as tort as occasion demanded, in order to apply Arkansas law
to each case. R. LEFLAR, Tmn LAW or CONFLICT OF LAWS 95-96 (1959).
17

See B.

CuRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS

18 55 Cal. 2d 588, 360 P.2d 906, 12 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1961).

128-76 (1963).
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propriety of this approach has nothing to do with whether the case
sounds in tort or in contract, the California court's use of interest
analysis in Reich v. Purcell was entirely to be expected.19
On an interest analysis Reich was an easy case. The apparof Missouri's damage limitation, the court found, was
purpose
ent
from "the imposition of excessive financial
defendants
to protect
2 ° In contrast to the refractory Kilberg v. Northeast Airburdens.
19 It is possible to quibble with parts of the opinion. The court's categorical
statement that "[in a complex situation involving multistate contacts . . . no single
state alone can be deemed to create exclusively governing rights," 67 Adv. Cal. at
562, 432 P.2d at 729, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 33, for example, is an understandable and praiseworthy attempt to discredit the place-of-the-wrong rule; but it seems not inconceivable
that there may be whole cases in which all states but one prove disinterested. I also
think it unfortunate that the court chose to perpetuate the silly quarrel over the locallaw theory. Complex cases, said the Chief Justice, demonstrate that "the forum can
only apply its own law." Id. Nobody, I think, has ever suggested why it makes the
smallest particle of difference whether a court feels it is applying foreign law as such
or applying a law of its own patterned upon foreign law; the important question,
under either theory, is whether foreign law is to be consulted at all.
Chief Justice Traynor's modern explanation of Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d
859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953), is certainly an improvement upon the original opinion in
that case; but it is not the way of interest analysis to resolve a dispute over intrafamily tort immunity by declaring without reference to the content of law, as the
court did in the language quoted from Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d
218 (1955), that the state of domicile "has the primary responsibility for establishing
and regulating the incidents of the family relationship." Id. at 428, 289 P.2d at 218.
All that was in issue in Emery- was whether California ought to grant relief under its
own law to a Californian injured by another Californian in Idaho. The answer is
obvious: Idaho would simply be meddling if it sought to extend an immunity law
embodying a policy of promoting family harmony or of protecting insurers from
fraud into California family and insurance relations. But there was no necessity, and
no justification, for the court at the same time to resolve the quite different case
of a California accident involving an Idaho family. It is true that Idaho's policy may
reach that case, but granting relief may serve legitimate California interests if
California law expresses such policies, in promoting safety on its highways and in
providing a fund for the satisfaction of California creditors who may have extended
aid to the victims. At first glance, therefore, this case seems a true conflict situation;
but one can easily, I think, agree with the New Hampshire and Pennsylvania courts,
Johnson v. Johnson, 107 N.H. 30, 216 A.2d 781 (1966) ; McSwain v. McSwain, 420 Pa.
86, 215 A.2d 677 (1966), that the marginal effect of the immunity rule upon the
behavior of drivers already deterred by the danger to themselves and by the threat
of damages to anyone outside their families is minimal, and that there is no reason
to invoke the rather unconvincing policy respecting local creditors unless there are
creditors in the actual case who will in fact go uncompensated absent recovery. This
analysis would lead to the conclusion that California should not apply its antiimmunity law to a California accident involving an Idaho family, and therefore
that the law of the domicile does govern both variants; but not for the shortcut
reason suggested by Emery.
20 67 Adv. Cal. at 565, 432 P.2d at 731, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 35. The court's analysis
of policies underlying the wrongful death laws and their damage limitations is a
standard one, so much so as to raise a danger signal. For no Ohio or Missouri
materials are cited in explanation of these policies; the court contents itself with
such general statements as "[l]imitations of damages for wrongful death . . . have
little or nothing to do with conduct," id. at 565, 432 P.2d at 730-31, 63 Cal. Rptr. at
34-35, and the "proceeds . . . are not distributed through the decedent's estate and,
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lines2 ' situation, in which the state with such a limitation was not

only the place of the accident but also the defendant's state of
incorporation and of principal business, in Reich the defendant
was a non-resident just passing through. "We fail to perceive,"
said the California court, "any substantial interest Missouri might
have in extending the benefits of its limitation of damages to trav2 2 Consequently
elers from states having no similar limitation."
"giving effect to Ohio's interests in affording full recovery to injured [Ohio] parties does not conflict with any substantial internot apply. ' 23
est of Missouri," and "the Missouri limitation does
Why was the court so confident that Missouri's policy applied
only to Missouri defendants? It is easy enough to agree that, in
recognition of the interests of other states, Missouri would not
want to extend its limitation to all wrongful death cases in the
world; 24 but an analyst with the traditional territorial bias would
doubtless assert, as dogmatically as the California court denied,
that Missouri policy does reach all accidents within the state. Professor Morris's great example of a camp manned entirely by Amer25
icans in a remote part of Quebec raises some doubt whether a
jurisdiction always cares what happens within its borders. But
has Chief Justice Traynor done any more in Reich than to rely
upon an anti-territorial bias that I share but cannot satisfactorily
explain? Must we fall back upon the unconvincing notion that
Missouri legislators can be presumed to be trying to please Missouri voters and therefore to have acted for their exclusive benefit? Is it enough to argue the incongruity of denying relief in Reich
while granting it if the same parties had collided in California?
Others might call it incongruous that the result should depend
upon whether one collides with a Missourian or a Californian; for
therefore, are not subject to the claims of the decedent's creditors." Id. at 565, 432
P.2d at 731, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 35. But Ohio's interest should be analyzed with an eye to
the language of its own statute and to any authoritative expositions of its purpose
by the Ohio courts, for surely these issues are matters that might differ from state
to state. See, e.g., Gore v. Northeast Airlines, 373 F.2d 717 (2d Cir. 1967), citing
New York state-court opinions that "the fear of large recoveries in wrongful death
actions might influence common carriers to exercise more care in transporting their
passengers than they might perhaps exercise if the possible recoveries in such actions
" Id. a.722. See also B. CuRRI, supra note 17, at 701-02,
were arbitrarily limited ....
comparing the policies of varying death statutes. Moreover, the quoted statements go
beyond the Reich case itself; as in Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218
(1955), the court seems very nearly to have decided a case not presented, namely, an
Ohio accident between Missourians.
21 19 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961).
22
28

67 Adv. Cal. at 565, 432 P.2d at 731, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 35.
Id.

24 Cf. B. CuRR=, supra note 17, at 81-82.
25 Morris, The Proper Law of a Tort, 64 HARv. L. REv. 881, 885 (1951).
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which factor is to be awarded the pejorative 'fortuitous" depends
once again on one's territorial or anti-territorial prejudice. Perhaps
more spadework needs doing on this basic and common problem.
An interesting wrinkle in Reich was provided by the fact that
the victims were "contemplating settling" in California and were
on their way there when the accident occurred. It was probably
unnecessary for the court to decide whether Ohio or California
law applied, since both were the same and since one or the other
was the home state at the time of the accident.20 But the court
held that the victims had not become Californians when struck
and that California therefore had no interest but Ohio had, This
may seem a bit artificial and might seem even more so had the
Reichs definitively abandoned their Ohio home and decided to
move to California, 27 but so would any other resolution of such a
borderline matter. Construction of laws in accord with policy always becomes fuzzy about the edges, but at least the process is
concerned with the relevant.
On the court's decision that the victims of the accident were
Ohio domicilaries, a further interesting question arose, since the
beneficiaries of the death statutes were Californians when the suit
was brought. This fact suggests two problems: first, whether the
focus of the California compensatory policy is upon victims or
upon their dependents; and second, the effect of the beneficiaries'
move to California after the accident. The ultimate beneficiaries
of California's compensatory policy are of course the dependents,
and it is they who might burden the state itself if there were no
recovery, Yet the prospect of determining the rights of beneficiaries from several states under as many different laws may
induce us to analogize the death benefit to an insurance policy.2"
Assuming that it is the dependents who are determinative, it is
easy to argue that California became interested in their welfare
when they moved in; yet the award of California damages, if
both Ohio and Missouri forbade them, might leave us uneasy.
Chief Justice Traynor said it would encourage forum shopping;
this suggests that plaintiffs might move after an accident to a state
26 But the fact that the domestic rules of all contact states would provide the

same outcome if applicable may not always dictate the result, for it is possible that
a policy analysis may show none of them applies. See D. CAVFRS, THE CHOICE-Or-LAW
PRocEss 34-43 (1965).
27 See In re Estate of Jones, 192 Iowa 78, 182 N.W. 227 (1921), holding for

estate-distribution purposes that an Iowan who had uprooted himself and set sail on
the Lusitania to make a new home in Wales was still an Iowan when torpedoed.
28 Or to find a policy of preserving a citizen's life by increasing the financial
goad toward a higher standard of care, or one of protecting the decedent's creditors
as in Gore v. Northeast Airlines, 373 F.2d 717 (2d Cir. 1967).
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with favorable death laws. 29 Underlying or buttressing this consideration is a retroactivity problem. The case supposed is Very
much as if California, having had a damage limitation, had repealed
it retroactively so as to allow full relief for accidents that had
occurred while the limitation had still been in force. It is a problem similar to that overlooked by the Supreme Court in Clay v.
30
Sun Insurance Office, Limited, where Florida was allowed to invalidate a suit clause in an insurance policy on the basis of an
interest that may have been acquired when the insured moved
into Florida after the policy was issued. In a case like Clay or
Reich, moreover, the retroactive assertion of an interest is more
offensive than in the usual domestic situation because, as the
it is precipitated by the unilateral act of
Chief Justice suggested,
31
an interested party.

The California court's frank holding that Missouri's limitation policy is only for local defendants suggests a constitutional
issue of discrimination against people from other states. Chief
Justice Traynor dealt with this issue obliquely by urging that
"[a] defendant cannot reasonably complain when compensatory
damages are assessed in accordance with the law of his domicile
and plaintiffs receive no more than they would had they been injured at home."8 2 But article IV of the Constitution requires that
a state give the citizens of other states the privileges and immunities it gives its own citizens, not the treatment they receive at
home. It would hardly seem appropriate for Missouri to tax the
Missouri income of Californians at twice the Missouri rate just
because California has high rates. Yet the article IV command of
altruism collides at some point with the prohibition against meddling found in the full faith and credit clause of the same article and
in the fourteenth amendment as well. When Nevada gives North
Carolinians the benefit of the same divorce laws that govern Nevada
29 Accord, id.
Judg66 377 U.S. 179 (1964). See B. Curfie, Full Faith and Credit, Chiefly to
91-99.
89,
REv;
CT.
Sur.
1964
Congress,
for
Role
A
ments:
31 The court's treatment of California law enabled it to conclude that California
had been
was a disinterested forum. If a conflict between Ohio and Missouri laws
The Disdiscovered, the court would have been in a pretty pickle. See B. Currie,
conflict
the
since
But
(1963);
754
.
PROB.
MP
CONTE
&
LAW
28
State,
Third
interested
case can
was a false one the case is significant principally as an illustration of how a
parties
come to be brought in a disinterested forum. It is rather easy if oie of the
Empresa,
has moved after the events in suit took place. See also Tramiontana v. S. A.
N.Y.2d
350 F.2d 468 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Long v. Pan American World Airways, 16
337, 213 N.E.2d 796, 266 N.Y.S.2d 513 (1965). In Long the court held the defehdant's
New York incorporation and business operations did not cieate a New York interest
in wrongful death damages and resolved a conflict between Maryland and Pehnsylvania
laws.
32 67 Adv. Cal. at 565, 432 P.2d at 731, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 35.
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citizens, it infringes North Carolina interests without promoting
its own. 3 Since article IV can hardly be read to require and to
forbid the same thing at the same time, Professors Brainerd Currie and Herma Kay concluded that a disinterested state is
forbidden, and consequently not required, to apply its own law to
defeat another state's interest. 4 This choice is not an arbitrary
one. In the first place, the opposite result would drain the full
faith clause of any power to fulfill its purpose to keep states from
meddling with what is none of their business. Secondly, a state
does not well serve the privilege clause's evident purpose of reducing interstate friction by giving nonresidents benefits that contravene their home state's policy. 5 Accordingly, the application of
Missouri's damage law in Reich was constitutionally forbidden,
not required. 6
Now that the courts are receptive to arguments departing
from the traditional analysis, the task of the ivory-clad is to develop tools for the solution of the more difficult cases that at first
glance involve true conflicts.87
For each interested state simply to apply its own law in such
cases88 is unappealing because it may cause forum-shopping and,
to the lawyer's tidy mind, simply because it is disuniform. It may
also have an adverse effect upon predictability at the planning
83 Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226
(1945).
84 See B. CUTRIE, supra note 17, at 445-525.
85 This would not technically occur if Missouri law were applied in
Reich, since
the court held that Ohio, but not California, had an interest in
granting full recovery. The prototype case used in the text is adequate to show the
appropriateness
of using this consideration to resolve the apparent conflict between
constitutional
commands.
36 This consideration lends force to the court's assertion in Reich
that the
interest analysis need not be less certain than the undeservedly hallowed
place-of-thewrong rule. Parenthetically it seems apt to add to the court's statement-that
recent
defections deprive the traditional rule of its chief virtue-the observation
that there
never was much certainty to begin with, because the rule was so
often and so unpredictably departed from by invocation of public policy, e.g., Mertz
v. Mertz, 271
N.Y. 466, 3 N.E.2d 597 (1936); by avoiding the tort classification,
e.g., Western Union
Tel. Co. v. Griffin, 92 Ark. 219, 122 S.W. 489 (1909); and even by
employing the
renvoi, e.g., Haumschild v. Continental Cas. Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95
N.W.2d 814 (1959)
(concurring opinion). Note also the possibility, exploited in Richards
v.
369 U.S. 1 (1962) (construing the Federal Tort Claims Act), of locatingUnited States,
the place of
wrong where the act rather than the injury occurred. Moreover,
interest analysis
produces no disuniformity in Reich, for the conflict is false; all courts
should agreeindeed the Constitution commands-that relief be granted.
37 Reich would present such a case if the defendant were from Missouri.
Such a
case is found in Bernkrant v. Fowler, 55 Cal. 2d 588, 360 P.2d 906,
12 Cal.
(1961); Kell v. Henderson, 47 Misc. 2d 992, 263 N.Y.S.2d 647 (Super. Rptr. 266
Ct. 1965),
aff'd, 26 App. Div. 2d 595, 270 N.Y.S.2d 552 (1966) (the reverse
of Babcock);
Lilienthal v. Kaufman, 239 Ore. 1, 395 P.2d 543 (1964).
88 See B. CUaaIE, supra note 17, at 119. For Currie's later explanation
or relaxation of this principle see text accompanying note 41 infra.
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stage: it cannot simply be predicted that the plaintiff-whichever he may be-will choose the most favorable law, because the
declaratory judgment remedy may make it possible for the prospective defendant to choose the forum. Moreover, I am unimpressed by
the argument that it is undemocratic for judges to attempt to balance interests, 9 for they do it all the time both in constitutional
litigation and in formulating the common law. The most serious
problem is whether a rational choice can be made between competing state interests.
Both courts and commentators have been at work on this
problem, and considerable progress has been made. Mr. Justice
Traynor led the way in his opinion in Bernkrant v. Fowler,4 ° recognizing that the interests of other states and the expectations of
the parties may properly be taken into account in determining the
reach of local policy. The older Professor Currie came fully to
accept this principle, enthusiastically approving Bernkrant, although he stubbornly refused to admit that it was proper to balance interests.' Professor Cavers attempted without conspicuous
success, to apply the same analysis to the troublesome Shanahan
v. George B. Landers Construction Company; 42 Professor Baxter
made it the core of his analysis, arguing that the comparativeimpairment principle would resolve most cases that appeared to
present true conflicts.4 8 At least two courts have avoided conflicts
in interspousal cases by this route. 44 Cavers has hinted that Oregon should have used this analysis and deferred to California law
in Lilienthal v. Kaufman4 5-where an Oregon spendthrift claimed
incapacity under Oregon law in a suit on a contract he had made in
California with a Californian-but I think this would have been a
mistake. It is California that should defer if the same problem is presented to its courts. To uphold contracts made in California by Oregon spendthrifts would open the door to wholesale defeat of Oregon's
protective policy; every spendthrift who wanted to risk his assets
would trot down to California. California policy, on the other hand,
89 See B. CuRnie, supra note 17, at 124, 272-80.
40 55 Cal. 2d 588, 360 P.2d 906, 12 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1961).
41 See B. Currie, supra note 31, at 757-61. Indeed he had anticipated Bernkrant,
in The Silver Oar and all that: A Study of the Romero Case, 27 U. Cm. L. REV. 1,
65-75 (1959).
42 266 F.2d 400 (1st Cir. 1959); see Cavers, The Conditional Seller's Remedies
and the Choice-of-Law Process--Some Notes on Shanahan, 35 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1126,
1139-42 (1960). For a much more far-reaching and substantial contribution to the
resolution of true or apparent conflicts see generally D. CAVERS, supra note 26.
48 Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1963).
44 See note 19 supra.
45 D. CAVES, supra note 26, at 189-92 (1965). Oregon did defer in a still more
recent true conflict decision based on an amalgam of contacts and interest analysis.
Casey v. Manson Constr. Co., 84 Adv. Ore. 947, 428 P.2d 898 (1967).
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is not greatly impaired by applying Oregon law to invalidate the contract, for the California businessman has plenty of people other than
Oregon irresponsibles with whom to contract. Cavers suggestion of
unfair surprise seems far-fetched in the extreme. What businessman
in his right mind would accept a promissory note for a substantial
sum without making a credit check, which would be certain to reveal
the spendthrift's questionable status?
Unfortunately, I think a number of cases will remain that
cannot fairly be solved on the comparative-impairment basis; vide
the notorious Kilberg problem. 6 Professors von Mehren and Trautman have made a manful attempt to get at these refractory cases,
suggesting among other things that substantive choices be made
according to whether a particular law is on the wax or the wane.4 7
Wrongful death limitations, and restrictions on the capacity of married women, for example, should be disregarded in true conflict
cases. That this process amounts to making law is no cause for
alarm, for judges rightly make lots of law. That it may involve
overruling the legislature is more serious if believed, but the problem after all is one of construction in the light of circumstances
not likely to have been foreseen by the legislature. It has been protested that a court should not abandon a local policy in conflicts
cases unless it is willing to do so in domestic cases as well,48 but
the desire to respect interests of other states is perhaps an adequate
distinguishing factor, as it is in the analogous cases subordinating
to a foreign interest any deterrent policy of a law allowing spouses
to recover damages. 49 The slippery nature of the determination of
whether a law is waxing or waning, or more generally whether it
is good or bad, is of course a problem and will decrease the uniformity attainable by this process unless it is undertaken by the
Supreme Court under the full faith and credit clause. But there is
plenty of uncertainty in interest analysis anyway, as there always
is in applying laws in accord with their policies, and maybe the
Court ought to undertake the job.5"
46 See note 6 supra.
47 A. VoN MEHEREN & D. TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS 215-408

(1965). See especially id. at 376-78, 394.
48 B. CURRIE, supra note 17, at 153-54, 154 n.82.
49 See text accompanying note 44 supra.
50 An obvious starting point is suggested by a variant of Western Air Lines v.
Sobieski, 191 Cal. App. 2d 399, 12 Cal. Rptr. 719 (1961). If California required and

Delaware forbade cumulative voting in the same corporation would the Court hold
that either state could apply its own law? Cf. Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359
U.S. 520 (1959), refusing under the commerce clause to let Illinois require contour

mudguards that Arkansas forbade. But why was it Illinois and not Arkansas that had
to yield? See the very interesting suggestion in Horowitz, Toward A Federal Common
Law of Choice oj Law, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1191, 1195 (1967), that the commerce
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Another possibility for dealing with irreducible conflicts would
be to resort-after all else has failed-to an arbitrary rule akin to
those of the first Restatement of Conflicts. Lest this suggestion be
thought a sellout, I hasten to observe that I reach this point only
after an analysis of state policies has led to the conclusion that
interest analysis gives no way to choose between two interested
states. At that point either choice will equally satisfy the interest
analysis, and it becomes appropriate to consider other relevant
policies such as the desire for uniformity and predictability. Some
of the Restatement rules, which were formulated with a territorial
imperative in mind, are too complicated to serve this purpose very
well; 5 ' some, like the place-of-contracting and place-of-incorporation rules, are too easily manipulable by one or both parties.
For example, a decision to refer the usury question to the place
of contracting should not be made without explicit consideration
of whether or not the law upholding such contracts is substantively
preferable. The best rule, as suggested rather snidely elsewhere
for the case in which there is no interested state, would be to apply
2
the law of the state first in the alphabet." But don't hold your
breath.
Interest analysis, like other methods of approaching choiceof-law, is not perfect. But it has the virtue of recognizing that
laws are adopted in order to accomplish social goals and that they
should be applied so as to carry out their purposes. Enlightened
courts have followed this principle for years in non-conflilcts cases;
Reich v. Purcell is welcome as additional evidence that its application to choice-of-law is no longer the exclusive preserve of the
professors.

Robert A. Gorman*
Reich v. Purcell is, I think, an easy case making good law. It is
a prime example of what has come to be called a "false conflict,"
a case in which the states which are factually related to the transclause itself may have something to say about choice-of-law, and his proposai for a
federal common-law choice-of-law doctrine binding upon the states and based upon
such "mlitistate policies" d§ the facilitation of multistate transactions.
51 An example is the place of contracting rule, which takes many sections to
define.
02 B. Ctam, supra note 17, at 609.
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